Authors: Tushar, Wayes; Saha, Tapan Kumar; Yuen, Chau; Morstyn, Thomas; Nahid-Al-Masood; Poor, H. Vincent; and Bean, Richard
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid (Volume: 11, Issue: 2, March 2020) https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2937981
Date Published: 28 August 2019
This paper proposes a peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme that can help a centralized power system to reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour. To do so, a cooperative Stackelberg game is formulated, in which the centralized power system acts as the leader that needs to decide on a price at the peak demand period to incentivize prosumers to not seek any energy from it. The prosumers, on the other hand, act as followers and respond to the leader's decision by forming suitable coalitions with neighbouring prosumers in order to participate in P2P energy trading to meet their energy demand. The properties of the proposed Stackelberg game are studied. It is shown that the game has a unique and stable Stackelberg equilibrium, as a result of the stability of prosumers' coalitions. At the equilibrium, the leader chooses its strategy using a derived closed-form expression, while the prosumers choose their equilibrium coalition structure. An algorithm is proposed that enables the centralized power system and the prosumers to reach the equilibrium solution. Numerical case studies demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.
Keywords: Peer-to-peer; energy trading; game theory; prosumer; auction; coalition formation
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Proposes a peer-to-peer energy trading scheme that can help a centralized power system reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour.